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FOIA and Privacy Act Interface: Toward a
Resolution of Statutory Conflict
INTRODUCTION
The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) I is designed to give the
American people maximum access to information in the files of
federal agencies. Its underlying premise is that an informed electo-
rate is essential to the continuation of democracy. 2 The FOIA re-
quires that all information held by any federal agency must be
disclosed to any person who requests it,3 unless the information falls
within one of the Act's narrowly construed exemptions.4
The Privacy Act of 1974,1 on the other hand, seeks to protect the
constitutional right of privacy of the millions of individuals who are
the subjects of records maintained by federal agencies.' It requires
that all federal agencies maintaining such records collect and pre-
serve only information relevant and necessary to accomplish an
agency purpose required by statute or executive order.7 In addition,
it grants individuals access to agency records8 and the right to
amend or correct any portion of the record which the subject be-
lieves is not accurate, timely, complete, or relevant to the purpose
for which the agency maintains the record.' The Privacy Act further
provides, with certain exceptions,'0 that agencies must not disclose
an individual's record to a third person or to another agency without
first obtaining the subject's consent." However, the Privacy Act also
provides that the individual's consent need not be obtained if disclo-
sure of the record is required under the FOIA. 2
Obviously, the FOIA's objective of maximum disclosure 3 cannot
be achieved without some invasion of privacy. Similarly, absolute
protection of the privacy of record subjects cannot be achieved with-
1. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970 & Supp. IV 1974) [hereinafter cited as FOIA].
2. S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1966) [hereinafter cited as S. REP. 8131.
3. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (Supp. IV 1974).
4. Dep't of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 361 (1976); Vaughn v. Rosen, 523 F.2d
1136, 1142 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067, 1080 (D.C. Cir. 1971). For a listing
of the exemptions, see note 14 infra.
5. 5 U.S.C. § 552a (Supp. IV 1974).
6. S. REP. No. 1183, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1974) [hereinafter cited as S. REP. 1183].
7. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(1) (Supp. IV 1974).
8. Id. §§ 552a(d)(1), (f)(1).
9. Id. § 552a(d)(2).
10. Id. § 552a(b)(1)-(11).
11. Id. § 552a(b).
12. Id. § 552a(b)(2).
13. S. REP. 813, supra note 2, at 3.
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out compromising the right of the public to full disclosure. Some
balance between these two laudable but inconsistent goals must be
attained. Unfortunately, the provisions of the two statutes are not
harmonious, and in certain areas the conflicts between them could
result in defeating the legislative purposes behind both the FOIA
and the Privacy Act. This article will examine some of the conflicts
between the FOIA and the Privacy Act and suggest a possible reso-
lution.
GENERAL PROVISIONS OF THE FOIA
The FOIA requires federal agencies to make available to the pub-
lic all information held by them unless the information falls within
one of nine carefully drawn exemptions. 4 Upon receipt of a request
by any person which "reasonably describes" the records sought and
conforms to the agency's published rules, 5 an agency must deter-
14. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1)-(9) (Supp. IV 1974). Subsection (b) exempts from mandatory
disclosure:
[Miatters that are . . . (1)(A) specifically authorized under criteria established
by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign
policy and (B) are in fact properly classified pursuant to such Executive order;
(2) related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency;
(3) specifically exempted from disclosure by statute;
(4) trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a per-
son and privileged or confidential;
(5) inter-agency or intra-agency memoranda or letters which would not be
available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency;
(6) personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would
constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy;
(7) investigatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the
extent that production of such records would (A) interfere with enforcement pro-
ceedings, (B) deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication,
(C) constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, (D) disclose the ident-
ity of a confidential source and, in the case of a record compiled by a criminal law
enforcement authority in the course of a criminal investigation, or by an agency
conducting a lawful national security investigation, confidential information fur-
nished only by the confidential source, (E) disclose investigative techniques and
procedures, or (F) endanger the life or physical safety of law enforcement personnel;
(8) contained in or related to examination, operating, or condition reports pre-
pared by, on behalf of, or for the use of an agency responsible for the regulation or
supervision of financial institutions; or
(9) geological and geophysical information and data, including maps, concern-
ing wells.
15. The requests for records with which this article deals are made under subsection
(a)(3), which provides:
Except with respect to records made available under paragraphs (1) and (2) of this
subsection, each agency, upon any request for records which (A) reasonably de-
scribes such records and (B) is made in accordance with published rules stating the
time, place, fees (if any), and procedures to be followed, shall make the records
promptly available to any person.
For an analysis of the 1974 amendments to the access provisions of the FOIA, see Note, The
Freedom of Information Act Amendments of 1974: An Analysis, 26 SYR. L. REV. 951 (1975).
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mine within ten working days whether the requested material falls
within one of the nine exemptions." If, after an administrative ap-
peal, the agency continues to deny disclosure of part or all of the
requested material, the requester may sue in federal district court
to enjoin the withholding of the material. 7 The court must deter-
mine the matter de novo. i8 The burden is upon the agency to justify
the denial; it must prove that the requested material falls within the
claimed exemption.' The court may examine the records in camera
to determine whether the records or any part of them are to be
withheld under any of the exemptions.'" If only a part of the mate-
rial is exempt, "any reasonably segregable portion" must be dis-
closed after deletion of the portions that are exempt.2' The only
remedy authorized by the statute for improper withholding of re-
cords is an injunction against the withholding.22
The FOIA does not deal with the question of what information the
agencies may maintain on an individual. It is concerned only with
the creation of and the limitations upon the right of the public to
obtain access to whatever information the agencies maintain. It is
the Privacy Act that first attempted to impose limitation upon the
types of information federal agencies may maintain and upon the
circumstances under which the information may be disclosed.
THE PROVISIONS OF THE PRIVACY ACT
The Privacy Act of 19742 is directed at a different set of problems
than those with which the FOIA is concerned. Its access provisions
are part of an overall scheme to prevent government invasions of
personal privacy. An individual wishing to obtain his or her record
from a federal agency must be given the record upon request. 4 Con-
16. 5 U.S.C . § 552(a)(6)(A) (Supp. IV 1974).
17. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (Supp. IV 1974) grants jurisdiction to federal courts in the
district where the plaintiff resides or has his or her principal place of business, where the
records are situated, or in the District of Columbia.
18. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (Supp. IV 1974).
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (Supp. IV 1974). This requirement applies not only in court proceed-
ings but at any time that the issue of an exemption is considered.
22. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (Supp. IV 1974). There is no provision for an award of dam-
ages to the requester incurred as a result of the delay in disclosure.
23. 5 U.S.C. § 552a (Supp. IV 1974).
24. 5 U.S.C. § 552a (d)(1) (Supp. IV 1974). Subsection (h) allows the parent of a minor
or the guardian of an adjudicated incompetent to request access on behalf of the minor or
incompetent.
Although Congress did not specifically state that an agency may make reasonable demands
for proof of the individual's identity, it did provide criminal penalties for knowingly and
willfully obtaining information under false pretenses. Id. § 552a (i) (3).
[Vol. 8
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gress, in passing the Privacy Act, found it necessary not only to
provide procedures for access 25 to and amendment or correction of
records, but also to regulate the collection, maintenance, use, and
dissemination of personal information by the agencies. "
25. Nothing in the Act dictates the degree of specificity required in a request for a record.
It appears that agencies may require the requester to name the system of records in which
he or she thinks the record may be found. See Dep't of Justice Regulations, 28 C.F.R. § 16.41
(b) (1975) [hereinafter cited as JUSTICE REGS.]; Office of Management and Budget Regula-
tions, 5 C.F.R. § 1302.1(b) (1976) [hereinafter cited as OMB REGs.1. Justice Regulations are
used because that Department is responsible for defending suits against the agencies under
the Act. OMB Regulations are cited because that agency is responsible for implementing the
Act and encouraging agency compliance. Pub. L. 93-579 § 6, 88 Stat. 1896, at 1909 (1974).
Apparently, a request which satisfies the requirement of the FOIA that it "reasonably
describe" the records sought might not be sufficiently specific as a Privacy Act request. For
example, the Justice Department requires a requester to
describe the nature of the records sought, the approximate dates covered by the
record, the system or systems in which it is thought to be included as described in
the "Notices of Records Systems" published by the General Services Administra-
tion, and the identity of the system manager or component of the Department
having custody of the system of records.
28 C.F.R. § 16.41(e) (1975). If the published Notice of Systems of Records for an individual
system contains a requirement of greater specificity, that requirement must be followed. Id.
The Office of Management and Budget Regulations, on the other hand, are more liberal; a
concise description of the system of records will suffice. 5 C.F.R. § 1302.2(b)(1)(i) (1976). This
potential problem may be alleviated where the agency provides a procedure whereby a reques-
ter can seek help in defining his or her request. See, e.g., JUSTICE REGS., supra, § 16.41(a). A
provision like this is particularly helpful for requesters who are unfamiliar with government
publications like the Federal Register and may have difficulty wading through the Notices
of Systems of Records.
The Privacy Act provides no time limitations within which an agency must respond to a
request, although the regulations of some agencies impose time limits. JUSTICE REGS., supra,
§ 16.45(b) provide time limits of 20 to 40 working days depending upon whether the records
requested exceed 100 pages, require consultation with another component or agency, and/or
are all maintained at the same location. See also OMB Regs., supra, § 1302.2(b)(2) providing
for a response to a request for records within 10 days, unless the Assistant to the Director for
Administration determines that the request cannot be answered in that time, requiring notifi-
cation of the requester with a statement of reasons when there is a delay.
The Act permits the agencies to impose fees for making copies of an individual's record.
However, it specifically prohibits fees to cover the cost of searching for the record. 5 U.S.C.
§ 552a(f)(5) (Supp. IV 1974). In this respect the Privacy Act differs from the FOIA, which
allows the agencies to impose reasonable charges both for search and for copying. Id. §
552(a)(4)(A).
The Privacy Act does not provide for administrative review of a denial of access or of a
failure to respond to a request, although specific agency regulations may provide for review.
E.g., JUSTICE RECS., supra, § 16.47.
26. Pub. L. 93-579 § 2(a)(5)(b), 88 Stat. 1896 (1974). Congress sought to remedy the evils
of secrecy and abuse of the government's information power which had included "illegal,
unwise, and overbroad investigation and . . . surveillance of law-abiding citizens," S. REP.
1183, supra note 6, at 2, wrongful disclosure and use by agencies of personal information,
secret gathering of information on individuals, and creation of secret information systems.
S. REP. 1183, supra note 6, at 2.
To accomplish these objectives, the Act requires all agencies to maintain in their records
only such information about an individual as is relevant and necessary to accom-
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Before disseminating an individual's record to anyone other than
an agency, the agency maintaining the record must make reason-
able efforts to assure that the record is accurate, timely, relevant,
and complete for the agency's purposes, unless disclosure is required
under the FOIA.2 7
An essential element of the Act's protection of individual privacy
is the requirement, with certain exceptions, that an agency obtain
the subject's consent before disclosing a record to any person or
agency.2" The consent requirement is intended to afford individuals
a measure of control over the dissemination of their records and the
uses to which those records are put.29
plish a purpose of the agency required to be accomplished by statute or by executive
order of the President.
5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(1) (Supp. IV 1974).
All records used by an agency must be maintained with such accuracy, timeliness, relev-
ance, and completeness as is reasonably necessary to assure fairness to the subject in any
determination made about him or her. Id. § 552a(e)(5). The agencies must collect their
information "to the greatest extent practicable" from the subject of the file when it might
be used to make an adverse determintion about his or her rights, benefits, or privileges under
federal programs. Whenever an agency requests information from a subject, it must inform
him or her of: (1) the authority under which the information is sought, (2) whether disclosure
is voluntary or mandatory, (3) the purposes for which it is collected, (4) the routine uses to
which it will be put, and (5) the consequences to the individual of noncompliance. Id. §
552a(e)(3)(A)-(D). In addition, federal agencies are prohibited from maintaining any record
of an individual's exercise of his or her first amendment rights unless the maintenance of the
record is expressly authorized by statute or by the subject individual or is pertinent to and
within the scope of an authorized law enforcement activity. Id. § 552a(e)(7).
In order to prevent the creation and maintenance of secret record systems, the Act requires
all agencies to provide advance notice to Congress and the Office of Management and Budget
of any proposal to establish a new system of records or to alter any existing system. This
requirement is intended to facilitate an evaluation of the potential effects of the proposal
upon the right of privacy and other individual rights. Each agency is required to publish
annually notice of the existence and nature of every record system it maintains. Id. §
552a(e)(4). This notice must include the name and location of each system, the categories of
subject individuals, the routine uses of the records, and the agency's practices with respect
to storage, retrievability, access controls, retention, and disposal. Id. § 552a(e)(4)(A)-(E). The
categories of users and the purposes of the routine uses must also be included. Id. §
552a(e)(4)(D).
27. Id. § 552a(e)(6). It is unclear why disclosures under the FOIA are exempt from this
requirement. Although the Senate Report expresses a concern that the Privacy Act may
undermine the right of the public and the press to information concerning the operation of
government, S. REP. 1183, supra note 6, at 71, the disclosure to third parties of inaccurate or
irrelevant information about an individual arguably could constitute an invasion of privacy
by presenting his or her affairs in a false light. Perhaps a record which the agency knows to
be inaccurate or irrelevant might be withheld on the ground that its disclosure would consti-
tute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy, at least until the agency could amend the
record to conform to the standards of the Privacy Act.
28. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(Supp. IV 1974).
29. S. REP. 1183, supra note 6, at 68. It is also expected to serve as a check upon the illegal
or inadvertent linkage or centralization of federal information systems with those of other
federal agencies, state and local governments, and the private sector. The premise underlying
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The more important exceptions to the consent requirement' in-
clude disclosure to officers or employees of the agency who have a
need for the record in the performance of their duties,3 disclosures
required under the FOIA, 31 disclosures for a routine use, 33 and disclo-
sures for a civil or criminal law enforcement purpose.3 4
Closely related to the consent requirement is the provision com-
pelling federal agencies to maintain an accounting of the disclosures
made of each record pertaining to an individual .3 Except for disclo-
sures made under subsection (b)(1)"5 or pursuant to the require-
ments of the FOIA, 7 the agencies must keep an accurate accounting
of the date, nature, and purpose of each disclosure of a record 3 and
the requirement is that if the subject of a record is allowed to know where and to whom the
information concerning him or her is disseminated, it will assist in the prevention of illegal
and improper uses of the information by agency personnel who have no business with it. Id.
30. Additional exceptions to the consent requirement are: (1) to the Bureau of the Census
for purposes of planning or implementing a census or survey, or other related activity; (2) to
a recipient who has provided adequate advance written assurance that the record will be used
solely for statistical research and reporting and that the record is to be transferred in a form
that cannot be individually identified; (3) to the National Archives of the United States, or
to the Administrator of General Services to determine whether the value of the record war-
rants its preservation in the Archives; (4) to a person who has shown compelling circumstan-
ces affecting the health or safety of an individual if notification is to be sent to the individual's
last known address; (5) to congressional committees; (6) to the Comptroller General in the
course of the performance of the duties of the General Accounting Office; and (7) pursuant
to the order of a court of competent jurisdiction.
31. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(1) (Supp. IV 1974). The primary justification for this exception is
to avoid unnecessary hindrance of the agency in the performance of its duties. S. REP. 1183,
supra note 6, at 70.
32. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(2) (Supp. IV 1974). To allow a subject to veto the disclosure of
information required to be disclosed under the FOIA would contravene the purposes of that
Act and arguably would be illegal under it. The FOIA's mandate of disclosure of nonexempt
information to "any person" appears to leave no room for a requirement of consent by the
subject of a requested record.
33. Id. § 552a(b)(3). The use of information for the purposes for which it was collected
logically should not require the subject's consent. He or she will have been informed of these
uses when the information was supplied. See note 26 supra.
34. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(7) (Supp. IV 1974). The release of information to a federal, state,
or local law enforcement agency was excepted from the consent requirement so that individu-
als who were the subjects of investigation would not learn of the investigation prematurely.
S. REP. 1183, supra note 6, at 73.
The law enforcement activity must be authorized by law, and the head of the requesting
agency or instrumentality must make a written request to the agency maintaining the record
which specifies the particular portion of the record desired and the law enforcement activity
for which it is sought. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(7) (Supp. IV 1974).
35. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(c)(Supp. IV 1974).
36. Subsection (b)(1) exempts disclosures to agency officers or employees who have need
for the record in the performance of their duties. However, the accounting must include
disclosures for a routine use.
37. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(c)(1) (Supp. IV 1974).
38. Id. § 552a(c)(1)(A). The agency must retain the accounting for at least 5 years after
the disclosure or for the life of the record, whichever is longer. Id. § 552a(c)(2) (Supp. IV 1974).
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the name and address of the recipient29 If an agency has not ex-
empted the system of records from access, the accounting, except
for records of disclosures for a law enforcement purpose, must be
made available to the subject on request. 0
Once an individual has received a copy of the record, he or she
may request that the agency amend or correct any portion which
allegedly is not accurate, timely, relevant, or complete.4 Denial of
amendment entitles the subject to administrative review42 and
eventual suit in federal district court.43 Upon review, if the reviewing
officer upholds the refusal to amend, the individual must be allowed
to file a concise statement of the reasons for his or her disagreement
with the agency's refusal, which must be included in any subse-
quent disclosure of the record.44 The right to challenge the contents
of one's record is, perhaps, the major advantage of pursuing the
right of access under the Privacy Act rather than under the FOIA.
Federal district courts are granted jurisdiction to entertain civil
actions under the Privacy Act 45 in five situations. They are (1) de-
nial of amendment requests by reviewing officers,4" (2) denial of
administrative review of refusals to amend,47 (3) denial of access
The purpose of this requirement is to enable a person examining the accounting to deter-
mine which employees, on any given day, had access to an individual's record, so that the
nature and pattern of an agency's transfers of personal information might be audited. S. REP.
1183, supra note 6, at 52.
39. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(c)(1)(B) (Supp. IV 1974).
40. Id. § 552a(c)(3).
41. Id. § 552a(d)(2).
42. Id. § 552a(d)(3). If the individual requests review of the refusal to amend, the review
must be completed within 30 working days, although the head of the agency may extend this
period "for good cause shown." Id. § 552a(d)(3). The Act does not specify to whom the "good
cause" must be shown or what constitutes "good cause." There is no statutory limit upon
the extension of time.
43. Id. § 552a(g)(1)(A).
44. Id. § 552a(d)(3),(d)(4). A concise statement of the agency's reasons for refusal may
also be included. Id. § 552a(d)(4).
The Act does not specifically require an agency to investigate alleged inaccuracies.
However, Congress appears to expect that the agency will make reasonable efforts to verify
both the requester's allegation and its own information by contacting any agency from which
it received the disputed material, questioning its own investigators, reviewing both its own
records and any material supplied by the individual, and reviewing its computer program-
ming. S. REP. 1183, supra note 6, at 75.
45. As under the FOIA, the action may be brought where the plaintiff resides or has his
or her principal place of business, where the records are situated, or in the District of Colum-
bia. Actions brought under the Privacy Act must be brought within 2 years from the time
the cause of action arises. However, if the agency has willfully made a material misrepresen-
tation of any information required to be disclosed under the Act, and the information is
material to the establishment of the agency's liability to the individual, the action may be
brought within 2 years of the time that the individual discovered the misrepresentation. 5
U.S.C. § 5. 2a(g)(5) (Supp. IV 1974).
46. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(1)(A) (Supp. IV 1974).
47. Id.
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requests,4" (4) maintenance of inaccurate, untimely, irrelevant, or
incomplete records which leads to a determination adverse to a
subject,49 and (5) other failure to comply with the Act resulting in
an adverse effect upon an individual.'" In suits brought either to
amend a plaintiff's record or to enjoin an agency's refusal to grant
a plaintiff access to his or her record, the court is to determine the
matter de novo;' it may conduct an in camera inspection to deter-
mine whether the record has been improperly withheld under
subsection (k).52 Where the plaintiff seeks amendment or correction
of a record, the court may order the agency to amend the record
either as the individual requested or as the court sees fit.53
In actions to obtain access to a record, the burden is upon the
agency to sustain its action. However, in suits to compel the amend-
ment of a record, there is no similar provision. Presumably, the
burden of proof falls upon the plaintiff in such cases.
The Privacy Act provides for criminal penalties in three situa-
tions: (1) where an officer or employee of an agency willfully makes
an improper disclosure of individually identifiable information to
someone not entitled to receive it;15 (2) where an officer or employee
of an agency willfully maintains a system of records without meet-
ing the statutory notice requirements; 6 and (3) where any person
knowingly and willfully requests or obtains any individual's record
under false pretenses. 7 In each instance, the party is guilty of a
misdemeanor and is subject to a fine of not more than $5,000.11
POTENTIAL CONFLICT BETWEEN THE PRIVACY ACT AND THE FOIA
The Conflicting Access Provisions
Both the FOIA and the Privacy Act create rights of access to
records held by federal agencies. 9 Both contain provisions exempt-
48. Id. § 552a(g)(1)(B).
49. Id. § 552a(g)(1)(C). In a suit against an agency for its failure to maintain an individ-
ual's record in accordance with the statutory standards, resulting in a determination adverse
to him or her, if the court determines that the agency acted in an intentional or willful
manner, the United States is liable to the plaintiff for the greater of either the actual damage
sustained or $1,000, plus costs and reasonable attorney's fees. Id. § 552a(g)(4)(A),(B).
50. Id. § 552a(g)(1)(D).
51. Id. § 552a(g)(2)(A), (g)(3)(A).
52. Id. § 552a(g)(3)(A). See text accompanying notes 78 through 82 infra.
53. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(2)(A) (Supp. IV 1974).
54. Id. § 552a(g)(3)(A).
55. Id. § 552a(i)(1).
56. Id. § 552a(i)(2).
57. Id. § 552a(i)(3).
58. Id. § 552a(i)(1),(2),(3).
59. Id. § 552(a)(3); id. § 552a(d).
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ing certain types of records from disclosure.60 Although the nature
and scope of the exemptions of the FOIA differ from those of the
Privacy Act, generally an individual can obtain his or her records
under either Act. If the system in which a desired record is con-
tained has not been exempted from the access provisions of the
Privacy Act, the individual will be able to obtain more information
under the Privacy Act than under the FOIA, because the exemption
of intra- and inter-agency memoranda would not apply."
The Justice Department originally contended that the Privacy
Act was the sole means available to individuals to obtain access to
their records. If a system of records had been exempted under the
Privacy Act, an individual who requested his or her record from that
system would obtain nothing under either statute.12 This interpreta-
tion has been modified somewhat. Justice Department Regulation
16.57, dealing with the relationship between the Privacy Act and the
FOIA, provides that any request by a record subject for his or her
file will be processed under the Department's Privacy Act regula-
tions. 3 Releases of records under that regulation beyond those re-
quired by the Privacy Act are at the sole discretion of the Deputy
Attorney General and his or her delegates."4 The regulation then
confers this authority upon the managers of the record systems. 5 It
further provides that to the extent that a requested record has been
exempted under the Privacy Act, the individual will receive the
records to which he or she is entitled under the Privacy Act and
which the system manager is willing to disclose as a matter of dis-
cretion. In addition, disclosure will be made of all records within
the scope of the request to which the individual "would have been
entitled" under the FOIA "but for the enactment of the Privacy
Act" and the agency's exemption of the system under the Act. 7
Section 16.57 is ambiguous. Subsection (b) states that a requester
"shall receive" all of the records to which he or she is entitled under
the FOIA. However, if the release of any records beyond the require-
60. Id. § 552(b)(1)-(9); id. § 552a(j),(k).
61. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5)(1970).
62. Letter from Deputy Ass't Att'y Gen. Mary Lawton to Meade Whitaker, Chief Counsel,
IRS, reprinted in 120 CONG. REc. S18146 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 1975) [hereinafter cited as Lawton
Letter].
63. JUSTICE REGS. supra note 25, at § 16.57(b).
64. Id. § 16.57(a)(1975).
65. Id.
66. Id. § 16.57(b)(1975).
67. Id. (emphasis added). This language clearly implies that the Department interprets
the Privacy Act as repealing by implication the FOIA's grant of access so far as it applies to
requests by individuals for their own records.
[Vol. 8
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ments of the Privacy Act is a matter of the system manager's discre-
tion, then the manager presumably has discretion to withhold any
material not required to be released under the Privacy Act, whether
or not the requester is entitled to the information under the FOIA.
The Justice Department's regulations further undermine the pur-
poses of both the Privacy Act and the FOIA. Where an individual
requests his or her record which has been exempted under subsec-
tion (j),1 (k)(3),11 or (k)(4), 1' or which has been compiled in antici-
pation of a civil proceeding, the Department "will neither confirm
nor deny the existence of the record."'" The individual will be told
only that there is no record available to him or her under the Privacy
Act.72 Such reticence on the part of the Department is not only
unwarranted, but also appears to contravene the mandate of the
Privacy Act that there be no secret maintenance of records.7 3
If an individual has requested information which has been ex-
empted from disclosure under subsection (j) and the system has also
been exempted from the grant of jurisdiction, 4 there may be some
question whether he or she can contest the withholding in court.
Where agency policy is to treat a subject's request for his or her
records as a Privacy Act request unless it specifies that it is made
only under the FOIA,7 ' the agency may contend that the court has
no jurisdiction to hear the case. If the request is indeed made only
under the Privacy Act, the court probably has no jurisdiction."
However, if the request was made under both acts or only under the
FOIA, it should be the jurisdictional provisions of the FOIA, not the
agency's policy, that control.
Where the agency employs Privacy Act procedures for all requests
68. The exemption for records maintained by the CIA or criminal law enforcement agen-
cies. See text accompanying notes 86-93 infra.
69. The exemption for records relating to the provision of protective services to the Presi-
dent or to others. See text accompanying note 97 infra.
70. The exemption for records required by statute to be used solely as statistical records.
See text accompanying note 98 infra.
71. JUSTICE REGS., supro note 25, at § 16.42.
72. Id.
73. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(4)(Supp. IV 1974).
74. Id. § 552a(g)(1)(B).
75. See, e.g., JUSTICE REGS., supra note 25, at § 16.57(b), which states that all requests
by individuals for records pertaining to themselves will be processed only under its Privacy
Act procedures. OMB RECs., supra note 25, at § 1302.2(b)(1)(i) provides that if a request
could be processed under either act and specifies either both acts or neither act, the Privacy
Act procedures will be employed; however, the individual will be so informed and will be
further informed of the existence of the FOIA and of the difference in procedures and costs
between the two Acts. Many, if not most, requests for information by individuals do not
specify the Act under which they are made. Lawton Letter, supra note 62.
76. Cf. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(j) (Supp. IV 1974).
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by individuals for their own records and then sends a requester the
cryptic response that there is no record available to him or her under
the Privacy Act, the individual on whom there actually is no record
may find that he or she has gone to court for nothing. If the individ-
ual made the request under both acts, there is a possibility that the
FOIA's exemption 377 could lead a court to hold that the agency is
exempt from suit, even though the FOIA does not permit agencies
to exempt themselves from suit. Clearly, the individual whose
objective is to obtain maximum disclosure should state that the
request is made primarily under the FOIA, and that he or she re-
quests, in addition, any other records that may be available under
the Privacy Act. It may even be desirable, when dealing with an
agency whose regulations are similar to those of the Justice Depart-
ment, to make a separate request under each Act, to insure maxi-
mum access.
Even where the agency has not exempted the record system from
the grant of jurisdiction, additional problems may arise as to the
permissibility of in camera inspection. Although the Privacy Act
provides that the court may examine records in camera which have
been exempted under subsection (k), 8 there is no similar provision
for the inspection of records exempted under subsection (j)-rec-
ords maintained by the CIA or by an agency whose primary function
is the enforcement of the criminal laws. The FOIA, on the other
hand, allows the court to conduct an in camera inspection of records
for which an agency has claimed any exemption."9 In addition,
under the FOIA, the burden of proof is on the agency to justify its
refusal to disclose."' The Privacy Act also places the burden on the
agency to sustain its action s.8 However, the burden of proof clause
immediately follows the provision for in camera inspection of re-
cords exempted under subsection (k). Because agencies exempting
records under subsection (j) may also exempt themselves from
suit,8 1 there is a question as to which party bears the burden of proof
where the records were exempted under subsection (j) and the re-
quest was processed under the Privacy Act. The spirit and purpose
of both statutes would dictate that the agency should bear the bur-
den of proof in this situation as well. This course is also more reason-
77. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3)(1970) (the exemption for records which are specifically exempted
from disclosure by statute).
78. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(3)(A) (Supp. IV 1974).
79. Id. § 552(a)(4)(B).
80. Id.
81. Id. § 552a(g)(3)(A).
82. Id. § 552a(j).
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able because the agency, which controls the records, can justify the
exemption more easily than the requester can show that the claim
of exemption is unjustified.
The Differing Nature and Scope of the Exemptions
The exemptions of the Privacy Act differ from those of the FOIA
in three major respects. First, an agency cannot claim an exemption
under the Privacy Act at the time it receives a request for records
unless it has first promulgated rules exempting all such records from
access."' Second, whether an exemption can be claimed under the
Privacy Act depends, in part, upon the nature and function of the
agency maintaining the record. 4 Third, the agency head may pro-
mulgate rules exempting entire systems of records from the opera-
tion of the Privacy Act," while the exemptions of the FOIA are
applied on a case-by-case basis.
Subsection (j)(1) permits the Central Intelligence Agency to pro-
mulgate rules to exempt any of its record systems from the access
provisions of the Privacy Act."6 Subsection (j)(2) allows the same
exemption for record systems maintained by an agency or compo-
nent whose principal function is the enforcement of the criminal
83. Id. §§ 552a(j), (k).
84. Section 552a(j)(1) allows the Central Intelligence Agency to promulgate a blanket
exemption for all its records, and section 552a(k)(3) allows an exemption for records
"maintained in connection with the provision of protective services to the President or to
others." Id. §§ 552a(j)(1),(k)(3).
85. Id. §§ 552a(j),(k). At the time the rules are adopted, the agency must include in its
statement the reasons for exempting a system of records from any provision of the Act. Id.
86. This subsection allows the agency to exempt record systems from any provision of the
Act except: subsection (b), the conditions upon disclosure; subsections (c)(1) and (2), requir-
ing the maintenance of an accounting; subsections (e)(4)(A)-(F), requiring publication in the
Federal Register of the existence and character of any record system maintained (see note 25
supra); subsection (e)(6), requiring agencies to assure that a record is accurate, timely,
relevant, and complete before disseminating it, unless the disclosure is made under the FOIA;
subsection (e)(7), prohibiting the maintenance of records on how individuals exercise their
first amendment rights unless expressly authorized by statute or unless pertinent to and
within the scope of an authorized law enforcement activity. However, agencies that may
exempt records under (j) are the ones most likely to be allowed to maintain these records;
subsections (e)(9) and (10), requiring the establishment of rules of conduct and administra-
tive and technical safeguards to protect the confidentiality of the records and the security
and integrity of the system; subsection (e)(11), requiring publication in the Federal Register
and the provision of an opportunity for public comment upon any proposed new use or
intended use of information in the system; and subsection (i), the criminal penalties.
The-justificaton for allowing the CIA to exempt its systems of records was that Congress
did not wish to jeopardize the collection of intelligence information pertaining to national
defense or foreign policy or to allow persons without a security clearance to inspect classified
information. S. REP. 1183, supra note 6, at 74. Congress was concerned with the "sensitivity"
of the "delicate information regarding national security" contained in the files of the CIA.
H.R. REP. No. 1416, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1974) [hereinafter cited as H. REP. 1416].
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laws. The exemption applies if the record system consists of: (1)
information compiled in order to identify criminal offenders and
alleged offenders, comprised only of identifying data and criminal
history;87 (2) information compiled for a criminal investigation that
is associated with an identifiable individual;" or (3) reports identifi-
able to an individual that are compiled at any stage of the enforce-
ment process."
Although these agencies are prohibited from maintaining secret
information systems, 0 they are permitted to exempt their record
systems not only from the access and challenge provisions of the
Act, but also from the grant of jurisdiction to the federal courts."
Thus, if an agency chooses to exempt a system of records from that
provision, there is no way that a requester can challenge the pro-
priety of the exemption. The suggestion that an agency might ex-
empt itself from suit is not mere speculation. The Justice Depart-
ment has, in fact, exempted record systems from that provision,
giving as its reasons only "because these systems are compiled for
law enforcement purposes and have been exempted from the access
provisions. 9 2 Thus, a criminal justice agency may maintain inac-
curate or irrelevant information in an individual's file indefinitely,
because there is no means for the individual to challenge the con-
tents of his or her record. Although the Senate Committee that
considered the bill was aware that the amendments to the FOIA
would allow individuals to obtain limited access to their records
compiled for law enforcement purposes,9 3 the potential impact of
subsection (j)(2) upon the right of access of individuals under the
FOIA was apparently not fully appreciated.
Subsection (k) of the Privacy Act allows an agency to promulgate
rules to exempt record systems from the operation of the access and
challenge provisions.94 A system of records may be exempted under
87. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(j)(2)(B) (Supp. IV 1974).
88. Id.
89. Id. § 552a(j)(2)(C).
90. Id. § 552a(e)(4).
91. Id. § 552a(j).
92. JUSTICE REc.S., supra note 25, at § 16.98(c),(d)(11). Fifteen record systems were ex-
empted from subsection (g) under this regulation, including the Drug Enforcement Adminis-
tration's Semi-Automatic Narcotic Trafficker Profiles and Specialized Automated Intellig-
ence Files.
93. S. REP. 1183, supra note 6, at 75. The Report states that the provision was intended
to reconcile the exemption with the amendments to subsection (b)(7) of the FOIA.
94. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(k) (Supp. IV 1974). Eligible agencies may also exempt their record
systems from subsections (c)(3) (requiring agencies to grant a subject access to the accounting
of the disclosures of his or her records); (e)(1) (the requirement of relevance and necessity);
(e)(4)(G),(H), and (I), requiring publication in the Federal Register of notice of the proce-
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this subsection if it is: (1) exempt from disclosure under the FOIA's
exemption for classified information;" (2) investigatory material
compiled for a law enforcement purpose, except that if the mainte-
nance of the information has resulted in a denial of any right, bene-
fit, or privilege for which an individual was otherwise eligible under
federal law, it must be made available unless disclosure would re-
veal the identity of a confidential source;" (3) maintained in
connection with the provision of protective services to the President
or to others;97 (4) required by statute to be used solely as statistical
records;9" (5) investigatory material compiled solely for the purpose
dures for obtaining access to a record (G), and challenging its contents (H), and of the
categories of sources of records in the system (I); and (F) (requiring the promulgation of rules
establishing procedures for obtaining access to a record and challenging its contents, for
seeking review of a refusal to amend, and establishing the fees to be charged for copying).
95. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(k)(1) (Supp. IV 1974). Section 552(b)(1) exempts information pro-
perly classified pursuant to criteria established by executive order. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1)
(Supp. IV 1974). The justification for exempting classified information from the access and
challenge provisions of the Act is that disclosure might damage the nation's foreign policy
and defense, because the material would no longer be subject to security controls. H. REP.
1416, supra note 86, at 19. Congress believed that the nation's foreign policy and defense
would also be compromised if the agencies maintaining such records were required to make
public the categories of their sources of information. S. REP. 1183, supra note 6, at 74.
96. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(k)(2) (Supp. IV 1974). If the information was given before the effective
date of the Privacy Act, it may be withheld to the extent that it would reveal the identity of
a source who gave it under an implied promise of confidentiality. If it was furnished after
the Act's effective date, it must be disclosed unless the source received an express promise of
confidentiality.
As to the investigatory law enforcement exemption, it was feared that disclosure of such
records to the investigation subjects would impair the inquiry by alerting them that their
activities were being monitored, enabling them to prevent detection or avoid prosecution. H.
REP. 1416, supra note 86, at 19.
Although information must be disclosed to the individual if its maintenance has led to the
denial of any right, benefit, or privilege under federal law, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(k)(2) (Supp. IV
1974), if no such denial has resulted, the information remains exempt if the agency so chooses.
No reason has been advanced for denying the subject access to such investigatory records
after the investigation has been completed and it is clear that no further action will be taken.
It would seem that the purposes of the Act would be better served if the exemption were
permitted to be claimed only where an agency could show that a specific governmental
interest would be damaged or impaired by disclosure of a record to its subject. In all other
cases, an individual should be allowed to obtain access to his or her records and to challenge
their contents.
97. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(k)(3) (Supp. IV 1974). The exemption for records relating to protec-
tive services was included because allowing access to these files would "vitiate a critical part
of Secret Service work which was specifically recommended by the Warren Commission." H.
REP. 1416, supra note 86, at 19. Probably, the same reasoning justifies exempting the record
system from the requirement of subsection (e)(4)(I) that the notice published in the Federal
Register include a statement of the categories of sources of records in the system, although
the House and Senate Reports do not specifically discuss this provision.
98. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(k)(4) (Supp. IV 1974). The exemption for statistical records was
justified on the ground that the records do not have a direct effect on any particular individual
and their disclosure would interfere with a legitimate agency activity which had been ap-
proved by Congress. H. REP. 1416, supra note 86, at 19. This reasoning overlooks the possibil-
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of determining suitability, qualifications, or eligibility for federal
civilian employment, military service, access to classified informa-
tion, or federal contracts;99 (6) testing and examination material
used solely to determine qualifications for appointment or promo-
tion in the civil service, if its disclosure would compromise the ob-
jectivity or fairness of the examination process;'"' or (7) evaluation
material used to determine potential for promotion in the armed
services.'"'
No justification was advanced in either the Senate or the House
Reports for allowing agencies to exempt their record systems from
the requirement that information be maintained only when it is
"relevant and necessary to a purpose of the agency required to be
accomplished by statute or by executive order."' ' However, once an
agency has exempted a record system from the operation of sub-
section (e)(1)-the requirement of relevance and necessity-there
is nothing to prevent it from maintaining information on an indivi-
dual which is wholly unrelated to its purposes or even forbidden
by other provisions of the Privacy Act.'0 3 Since under subsection
(j) the agency may also exempt the record system from the grant
of jurisdiction to the federal courts to hear cases alleging violations
of the Act,'0 4 challenge is impossible. This apparent contradiction
is especially important in light of the congressional purpose not
only to provide access to and challenge of records, but also to im-
pose restraints upon the information power of the government in
order to protect the constitutional rights of privacy and due pro-
cess.'0 5 The Senate Committee on Government Operations consid-
ity that statistical records, like any other records, are required to be disclosed under the FOIA
unless the agency can show that they fall within one of the nine exemptions. 5 U.S.C. §
552(a)(3),(b) (Supp. IV 1974). It is just this sort of rationalization for withholding that the
FOIA was designed to eliminate.
In some cases under the FOIA, the agency released statistical records while withholding
other exempt information. See, e.g., Rural Housing Alliance v. Department of Agriculture,
498 F.2d 73 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
99. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(k)(5) (Supp. IV 1974). The provision concerning confidential sources
is identical to that in subsection (k)(2). See note 96 supra.
100. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(k)(6)(Supp. IV 1974).
101. Id. § 552a(k)(7). The provision protecting confidential sources is identical to those
in subsections (k)(2) and (k)(5). See note 96 supra.
As in subsection (j), the agency must include its reasons for exempting a system of records
from a provision of the Act at the time the rules are promulgated. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(k) (Supp.
IV 1974).
102. Id. § 552a(e)(1).
103. See. e.g., id. § 552a(e)(7), which restricts the authority of the agencies to maintain
records of an individual's exercise of his or her first amendment rights. See note 26 supra.
104. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(1),(j)(Supp. IV 1974).
105. S. REP. 1183, supra note 6, at 16.
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ered the statutory standards of necessity and relevance a minimum
safeguard essential to the effectiveness of the Act.
The Committee is convinced that effective legislation must pro-
vide standards for and limitations on the information power of
government. Providing a right of access and challenge to records,
while important, is not sufficient legislative solution to threats to
privacy. . . . [Ilt is not enough to tell agencies to gather and keep
only data which is reliable by their rights for whatever they deter-
mine is their intended use, and then to pit the individual against
government, armed only with a power to inspect his file and a right
to challenge it in court. . . .To leave the situation there is to shirk
the duty of Congress to protect freedom from the incursions by the
arbitrary exercise of the power of government and to provide for
the fair and responsible use of that power.00
Thus, permission to exempt record systems from the statutory re-
quirements of necessity and relevance appears to undermine the
avowed purposes of the Privacy Act."7
It might be expected that this problem would be alleviated some-
what by the requirement that agencies make reasonable efforts to
assure that a record is accurate, timely, relevant, and complete
before disclosing it to third parties. 08 However, disclosures required
by the FOIA are excepted from this requirement.'"9 Thus, inaccur-
ate, misleading, or damaging information on a subject may be re-
leased to a third party requester. Even if the subject later gains
access to his or her record and obtains amendment of the misleading
portions, the FOIA recipient will not receive the amendment be-
cause no accounting of FOIA disclosures is required." 0
Because FOIA disclosures are excepted-from these requirements,
a record subject about whom inaccurate or damaging information
had been circulated has no recourse. If the record is contained in a
106. Id. The Report defined "privacy" as
a shorthand term for the restraint on the power of government to investigate indi-
viduals, to collect information about their personal lives or activities in society or
in ways which are banned by the Constitution, or for reasons which have little or
nothing to do with the purpose of government or of the agency involved as their
powers are defined by the Constitution and specific statutes.
S. REP. 1183, supra note 6, at 17 (emphasis added).
107. The Senate Report states that the Act in part is
designed to prevent the kind of illegal, unwise, investigation and record surveillance
of law-abiding citizens produced in recent years from actions of some overzealous
investigators ...
S. REP. 1183, supra note 6, at 2.
108. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(6)(Supp. IV 1974).
109. Id.
110. Id. § 552a(c)(1),(c)(4).
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system which has been exempted from access under the Privacy
Act, the subject may never know that the government maintained
such damaging information, that it was disclosed, or that it may
have been used against him or her by the FOIA recipient.
In such a case, the remedies provided in the Privacy Act for the
adverse effect of an agency's failure to comply with the Act", would
be useless. Even if the subject could prove that the agency main-
tained information on him or her that did not meet the statutory
standards, it would be impossible to prove that its dissemination
caused the harm alleged without knowing who had received the
information.
FOIA EXEMPTION 3 AND THE PRIVACY ACT EXEMPTIONS
Subsection (q) of the Privacy Act expressly prohibits agencies
from relying on the exemptions of the FOIA to withhold information
otherwise available to the requester under the Privacy Act. How-
ever, neither Act contains any provision dealing with the situation
where an individual requests his or her records under the FOIA
when the agency has exempted them from disclosure under the
Privacy Act. In addition to claiming that portions of the requested
record are exempt under the FOIA, the agency may contend that
under the Privacy Act its exemption of the system containing the
record renders the entire record "specifically exempted from disclo-
sure by statute" and therefore unavailable under the FOIA's exemp-
tion 3. An agency might use this argument to withhold a record from
its subject even though none of the other FOIA exemptions applied.
FAA Administrator v. Robertson
This argument might appear to be "bootstrapping," but it is lent
credence by the Supreme Court's decision in FAA Administrator v.
Robertson. "3 Robertson involved a request by persons representing
a public interest group, the Center for the Study of Responsive Law,
who requested Systems Worthiness Analysis Program (SWAP) re-
ports from the Federal Aviation Administration. SWAP reports con-
sisted of the FAA's analysis of the performance and operations of
commercial airlines and were based largely upon information sup-
plied to FAA investigators by airline operators.
Section 1104 of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 provided, in part,
that if "any person" made objection to the public disclosure of
111. Id. § 552a(g)(1)(D).
112. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3)(1970).
113. 422 U.S. 255 (1975).
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information obtained by the agency, the agency should order the
information withheld when, in its judgment, a disclosure of such
information would adversely affect the interests of such person and
was not required in the public interest."' The FAA refused to pro-
duce the reports, and the requesters sought administrative review.
While the appeal was pending, the Air Transport Association filed
an objection pursuant to section 1104 on behalf of its airline mem-
bers. The FAA then denied the request, stating that the reports were
exempt under the FOIA's exemption 3.
Both the district court"' and the court of appeals"' ruled that the
reports were not specifically exempted from disclosure by statute.
The court of appeals held (1) that the language of the exemption
required that the statute upon which the agency relied specify or
categorize the documents for which the exemption was claimed, and
(2) that section 1104 was not within the FOIA exemption because
it "delegated 'broad discretionary power' under a 'public interest
standard.""'" It reasoned that one of the main purposes of the FOIA
was to eliminate vague phrases such as "in the public interest" or
"for good cause shown" as a basis for withholding information."'
Therefore, section 1104 could not be considered a specific exemption
by statute within the meaning of exemption 3.
The Supreme Court reversed."' In an opinion by Chief Justice
Burger, the Court found that the FOIA's exemptions indicate a
congressional judgment as to the types of information that the agen-
cies must be permitted to keep confidential if they so choose.2 0 It
noted that "the language of Exemption 3 contains no 'built-in' stan-
dard,"'' but is ambiguous, necessitating resort to the legislative
history. 122
The Court found the legislative history of exemption 3 indicated
clearly that Congress was aware of the many previously enacted
statutes authorizing withholding information to protect the public
interest.2 3 Congress did not appear to have distinguished among
them upon the basis of whether standards for non-disclosure were
provided or upon the degree of discretion left to agency officials. 24
114. 49 U.S.C. § 1104 (1970).
115. 498 F.2d 1031, 1032 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (summary of unpublished opinion).
116. Id.
117. Id. at 1034.
118. Id. at 1035.
119. FAA Administrator v. Robertson, 422 U.S. 255 (1975).
120. Id. at 262.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 263.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 263-64.
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The Court reasoned that to rule that material withheld under sec-
tion 1104 or a similar statute was not exempt under subsection
(b)(3) would be to construe the FOIA as repealing by implication
all existing statutes restricting access to public records.'25 The
Robertson Court held the term "specific," as used in the exemption,
could not be read to mean that the exemption applied only to docu-
ments which were specified either by name or by category,'26 for
such an interpretation would require Congress to undertake an im-
possible task.'27 Further, it would imply that Congress had re-
evaluated every previously enacted statute which delegated author-
ity to withhold information, an implication which was contradicted
by the legislative history.2 8
The opinion stressed the doctrine that "repeals by implication are
disfavored,"''1 and that when courts are faced with statutes capable
of co-existence, it is their duty-absent a clearly expressed congres-
sional intent to the contrary-to regard both as effective.10 There-
fore, the Court reasoned, it would be unreasonable to believe that
Congress had repealed by implication so many statutes, each of
which had been carefully considered to meet a specific need.
Clearly, Congress had intended to let these laws stand.'
The Court further noted that the congressional intent to open up
most public records under the FOIA was not irreconcilable with an
intent to preserve a large measure of discretion respecting the confi-
dentiality of the SWAP reports, so as to insure continued access to
necessary and sensitive information. 32 Because Congress could not
reasonably anticipate every situation in which withholding was war-
ranted, statutes vesting regulatory agencies with broad discretion
were inevitable.1
If a case arises where an agency bases its denial of a FOIA request
upon its Privacy Act regulation exempting the system containing
the record, Robertson would provide authority for the argument
that the record is specifically exempted from disclosure by statute.
Although Robertson applied to discretionary withholding statutes
125. Id. at 265.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. The Court cited H. REP. 1497, which stated that earlier statutes restricting access
to information would not be modified by the FOIA.
129. Id., citing Rail Reorganizaton Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 133 (1974).
130. 422 U.S. at 266, quoting 419 U.S. at 133-34, quoting Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S.
535, 551 (1974).
131. 422 U.S. at 266.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 266-67.
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enacted prior to the FOIA, the Supreme Court's reasoning that such
statutes are inevitable because Congress cannot anticipate every
situation in which withholding is necessary, 34 would be equally
applicable to later statutes like the Privacy Act. Should courts fol-
low this line of reasoning, the congressional intent in enacting and
amending the FOIA would be undermined. This is especially ironic
because the amendments to exemptions 1 and 7, passed only a few
weeks before passage of the Privacy Act, were intended to broaden
access to some of the same records which may be exempted from
access under subsections (j) and (k) of the Privacy Act. 3' Even more
ironic is the possibility that a third party requester would be able
to obtain information from a file while the subject of the file would
not. The reason for this anomaly is that the Privacy Act and its
exemptions apply only to requests by individuals for access to their
own records.
The Problem of Determining the Congressional Intent
There is no reported case dealing with the application of exemp-
tion 3 of the FOIA to the Privacy Act exemptions. When such cases
begin to come before the courts, it will be necessary to determine
congressional intent to resolve the question whether records ex-
empted under the Privacy Act are, by the agency's action, exempt
from any disclosure. Determining the congressional intent will be an
extremely difficult task, since the House and Senate Reports on the
two acts express not only different, but opposite, intentions. For
example, the House Report on the Privacy Act states that the Act
will have an effect on exemption 6 of the FOIA. 3 1 The House bill,
which was not the bill enacted, would have made most individually
identifiable information exempt from disclosure to the public. 37
However, the Senate Report on S. 3418, the present Privacy Act,
expresses the intent to preserve the right of access to information
under the FOIA. 31 It is in order to protect the right of public disclo-
sure under the FOIA that the Privacy Act's restrictions on disclosure
do not apply to disclosures required under the FOIA.'3
Both the Senate and the House Reports clearly state that it would
be undesirable to allow individuals access to their own intelligence
134. Id. at 263, 266.
135. E.g., investigatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes and classified
information.
136. H. REP. 1416, supra note 86, at 13.
137. Id.
138. S. REP. 1183, supra note 6, at 71.
139. 5 U.S.C. §§ 552a(b)(2),(c)(1)(Supp. IV 1974) (exempting disclosures required under
the FOIA from the consent and accounting requirements). S. REP. 1183, supra note 6, at 71.
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or law enforcement investigatory records.'4 ° However, both Houses
expressed a contrary intent by passing the amendments to exemp-
tions 1 and 7, which expanded access to classified information and
investigatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes.'4 ' The
Conference Report on the FOIA amendments "2 states that the
classified documents exemption was narrowed to require documents
to be properly classified to qualify for the exemption' and that in
camera inspection was viewed as an important part of the court's
de novo determination of whether the material was actually ex-
empt.' The Conference Committee clearly intended maximum re-
sponsible disclosure;' 5 this conclusion is further supported by the
requirement that any reasonably segregable portion of a record be
disclosed after deleting the portions that are exempt. "6 In its dis-
cussion of the amendments to exemption 7, the Conference Report
states that those amendments were intended to clarify congressional
disapproval of certain court decisions which expanded the scope of
agency authority to withhold investigatory records compiled for law
enforcement purposes." 7 It emphasized that such terms as "national
security," "criminal law enforcement authority," and "intelligence"
were to be narrowly construed and set limits on how each term
should be defined."' Although the Senate committee responsible
for the Privacy Act was aware of the passage of the amendments to
these exemptions," 9 it appears that the potential impact of the Pri-
vacy Act exemptions upon these newly-expanded rights of access
under the FOIA was not fully appreciated or considered. Unless it
be contended that the intention of Congress in passing the Privacy
Act was to take away with one hand what it had just given with the
other, it may be that congressional intent is neither clear nor dis-
cernible.
A POSSIBLE SOLUTION: THE DOCTRINE DISFAVORING REPEALS By
IMPLICATION
Interestingly, one rule of law the Supreme Court used in
Robertson to reach the conclusion that section 1104 made SWAP
140. S. RE. 1183, supra note 6, at 23, H. REP. 1416, supra note 86, at 18, 19.
141. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1),(7)(Supp. IV 1974), amending 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1),(7)(1970).
142. H. REP. No. 1380, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974) [hereinafter cited as H. REP. 1380].
143. Id. at 12.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 13.
146. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(Supp IV 1974).
147. H. RP. 1380, supra note 142, at 13.
148. Id.
149. S. REP. 1183, supra note 6, at 75.
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reports specifically exempt from disclosure by statute would lead to
the opposite conclusion if used by a court in a case involving the
discretionary exemptions of the Privacy Act. It is a canon of statu-
tory construction that repeals by implication are disfavored-that
is, a later statute will not be interpreted to repeal by implication an
earlier one unless there is a clearly expressed legislative intent to
that effect. 5 " Unless there is an affirmative showing of an intent to
repeal, the only justificaton for a repeal by implication is that the
two statutes are irreconcilable. 5'
[But] when two statutes are capable of co-existence, it is the duty
of the courts, absent a clearly expressed congressional intention to
the contrary, to regard each as effective.5 2
This canon of construction is based upon a presumption that Con-
gress had given serious consideration to the earlier statute'53 so that
before deciding that it has been repealed or amended, "it is reasona-
ble for a court to insist on the legislature's using language showing
that it has made a considered determination to that end.' 54
It cannot seriously be contended that Congress made a considered
determination to repeal the amendments to the FOIA exemptions
only a few weeks after they were enacted. Certainly there is no
language in subsection (j) or (k) of the Privacy Act indicating that
Congress expressly intended to deny access to those records under
the FOIA. The Senate Report expressed the intention that the eligi-
ble agencies use the opportunity to exempt records sparingly and
disclose records whenever a specific governmental interest would
not be harmed.'55 It should be remembered that Congress overrode
a presidential veto to enact the FOIA amendments.'56 It is not likely
that the result of such an effort would be deliberately cast aside the
very next month.'57 Assuming that Congress gave serious considera-
tion to both acts, it can only follow that the broadening of access
150. FAA Administrator v. Robertson, 422 U.S. 255 (1975); Rail Reorganization Cases, 419
U.S. 102 (1974); Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974).
151. 417 U.S. at 550.
152. Id. at 551.
153. 419 U.S. at 134.
154. Id., quoting In re Penn Central Trans. Co., 384 F. Supp. 895, 943 (S.C.R.R.R.A.
1974).
155. S. REP. 1183, supra note 6, at 74.
156. President Ford vetoed the FOIA amendments on October 17, 1974. 10 WEEKLY COMP.
OF PRES. Doc. at 1318 (1974). The House overrode the veto on November 20, 1974. 120 CONG.
REC. H10873 (daily ed. Nov. 20, 1974). The Senate overrode it the following day. 120 CONG.
REC. S19806 (daily ed. Nov. 21, 1974).
157. The Privacy Act was passed on December 18, 1974 by the Senate and on the following
day by the House. Pub. L. 93-579, 88 Stat. 1896, 1910 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552a (Supp. IV
1974)).
19771
Loyola University Law Journal
under the FOIA was intended to be effective in spite of the discre-
tion to exempt records under the Privacy Act.
The two acts are not irreconcilable. The access provisions of the
Privacy Act are for the most part intended to allow the individual
to obtain the entire record. To allow agencies to exempt certain
record systems from this unrestricted access is not inconsistent with
continuing to permit the more limited access available under the
FOIA.'5 8
CONCLUSION
The purpose of the FOIA is to provide for public scrutiny of the
operations of the federal government by providing access to the
records it maintains. The exemptions of that Act are designed to
protect certain governmental interests in the confidentiality of spe-
cific categories of information. The Privacy Act was not intended to
conflict with the FOIA or to undermine its purposes. Rather, the
purpose of the Privacy Act is to protect individuals from invasions
of their constitutional right of privacy caused by abuses of the gov-
ernment's power to collect, maintain, and disseminate information.
Although the Privacy Act requires certain safeguards before disclo-
sure of a subject's record to third parties, requests for information
,under the FOIA are excepted from these restrictions.
The right of access to records provided by the Privacy Act serves
a different purpose from that of the FOIA. It is intended to allow
individuals to determine whether the information maintained on
them is accurate, timely, relevant, and complete. It is supple-
mented with a right to seek amendment or correction of any portion
of the record that does not meet these statutory standards.
The exemptions of the Privacy Act permit agencies to exempt
entire systems of records from access. All of these records were pre-
viously available, at least to a limited extent, under the FOIA. Only
a few weeks before it passed the Privacy Act, Congress had broad-
ened access to some of the same records which may be exempted not
only from access, but also from suit under the Privacy Act. Because
agencies are not forbidden to use their regulations exempting record
systems from access under the Privacy Act as a basis for the denial
of FOIA requests, there is a danger that they may use the Privacy
Act to undermine the right of public disclosure under the FOIA.
The rights created by both acts are extremely important for the
158. Any applicable exemption of the FOIA would limit access under that Act. Particu-
larly important with respect to materials which would be exempted under subsection
(i),(k)(1), or (k)(2) would be exemptions 1, 5 (intra- and inter-agency memoranda), and 7.
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preservation of democratic government and our civil rights and lib-
erties. Neither act should be implemented in a way that would
undermine the goals of the other. Rather, the rights of access cre-
ated by each act should be treated by the courts and the agencies
as separate and independent.
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